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RECENT DECISIONS
Parental Relation Not a Bar
To Recovery in Negligence
Actions
Plaintiff was allegedly injured in an
automobile accident caused by the negli-
gence of her son, then an unemancipated
minor. The trial court granted the moth-
er's motion to strike the defense of intra-
family immunity from the son's answer
and denied the son's motion for sum-
mary judgment. In affirming, the Su-
preme Court of Minnesota held that in
all tort actions brought by a parent against
his child, intrafamily immunity would no
longer be considered a valid defense.1
Balts v. Balts, - Minn. -, 142 N.W.2d
66 (1966).
The immunity of an unemancipated
minor from liability in negligence suits in-
The Court indicated that the decision would
not be given retroactive effect. Baits v. Baits,
142 N.W.2d 66, 75 (Minn. 1966).
stituted by his parent is an American
judicial rule of comparatively recent or-
igin.2 Apparently, the first reported neg-
ligence action brought by a parent against
an unemancipated child was Schneider v.
Schneider,3 where the plaintiff sued for
personal injuries received in an automobile
accident. Based on the common-law rule
restricting a legal guardian from suing his
ward during the pendency of the guardian
relationship, 4 the Maryland court held that
2 No American court has been able to rely on
a British precedent regarding litigation between
a parent and his child. A child's absolute im-
munity from suit was unknown at common law,
and there is no mention of any prohibition of
a parent's suit in any early treatise. See 1
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *452; COOLEY,
TORTS 171 (1879); EVERSLEY, DOMESTIC RE-
LATIONS 601 (1885); REEVE, DOMESTIC RE-
LATIONs 287 (1816).
% 160 Md. 18, 152 At. 498 (1930).
4 Note that of the guardian-ward cases cited by
Schneider only one case, Davis v. Ford, 7 Ohio
it would be inconsistent for the mother, as
natural guardian of her son, to occupy
the simultaneous relationship of provider
and plaintiff.5 The court, cognizant of the
fact that a minor child had been unable
to sue his parent in tort since the Hewlett
v. George 6 case in 1891, reasoned that
the parent-child relationship precluded suit
by either party.
The Schneider assimilation of the Hew-
lett child-plaintiff rationale 7 to parent-
plaintiff cases gained widespread accept-
ance. Subsequently, courts justified a de-
nial of parent-plaintiff suits on the basis
of the policy prohibitions relevant to child-
plaintiff litigation.8 These policy consid-
erations include: (1) the preservation of
the family exchequer; 9 (2) the possibility
of the tortfeasor inheriting the judgment
and thereby benefiting from his wrong;10
104 (1836), supports this common-law rule.
In that case the guardian was completely pro-
hibited from recovering from his ward in a
property action until the guardianship relation
ceased since such an action would be "sub-
stantially a suit by the guardian against himself."
Id. at 110.
5 Schneider v. Schneider, 160 Md. 18, 152 AtI.
498 (1930).
068 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1891).
7The Hewlett court acknowledged the real in-
juries wrongfully done to the plaintiff child, but
forbade the suit for "the peace of society and
of the families composing society and sound
public policy .... ." Id. at 711, 9 So. at 887.
"So long as the parent is under [the] obligation
to care for, guide, and control, and the child is
under reciprocal obligation to . . . obey," said
the court, "no such action as this can be main-
tained." Ibid.
8 Parker v. Parker, 230 S.C. 28, 94 S.E.2d 12
(1956); Turner v. Carter, 169 Tenn. 553, 89
S.W.2d 751 (1936).
' Roller v. Roller, 37 Wash. 242, 79 Pac. 788
(1905).
10 Ibid.
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(3) the threat to domestic unity and har-
mony;" (4) the danger of fraud and col-
lusion; 12 (5) the disorganization of family
government; 1 3 and (6) the potential de-
terioration of parental discipline and con-
trol. 4  These factors can be divided into
three major categories: parental discipline
and control, family harmony, and fraud
and collusion.
The underlying basis of any prohibition
against a child-plaintiff recovering from his
tortious parent is the judicial conviction
that the parent's duty to support and
discipline his child carries with it a cor-
relative right to use wide discretion.15 The
child's ability to sue his parent for every
mistake in parental judgment has been
viewed as subversive to the best interests
of the child. 16 When the distinctions be-
tween the child-plaintiff and parent-plain-
tiff types of suit are considered, however,
the danger to parental discipline and con-
trol seems minimal in the latter type.
Thus, in the parent-plaintiff type of ac-
tion, it has been suggested that suit should
be prohibited only when the action would
cause the child to disrespect his parent.
17
11 Cannon v. Cannon, 287 N.Y. 425, 40 N.E.2d
236 (1942); Small v. Morrison, 185 N.C. 577,
118 S.E. 12 (1923); Roller v. Roller, supra note
9. See also Cafaro v. Cafaro, 181 N.J.L. 123,
191 Atl. 472 (1937).
12 Schneider v. Schneider, supra note 5.
13 Matarese v. Matarese, 47 R.I. 131, 131 Atl.
198 (1925); Ball v. Ball, 73 Wyo. 29, 269 P.2d
302 (1954).
24 Parker v. Parker, supra note 8.
15 Cannon v. Cannon, supra note 11. See Davis
v. Smith, 126 F. Supp. 497 (E.D. Pa. 1954),
aft'd, 253 F.2d 286 (3d Cir. 1958); Dunlap v.
Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 150 At. 905 (1930).
16 McCurdy, Torts Between Persons in Domestic
Relation, 43 HARV. L. Rv. 1030, 1076 (1930).
"7 Gaudreau v. Gaudreau, 106 N.H. 551, 215
A.2d 695 (1965); McCurdy, Torts Between Par-
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It must also be recognized that the
doctrine of immunity of the parent from
suit by the child is itself subject to man-
ifold limitations. Where the parent com-
mits a malicious tort against the child or
has acted in a reckless or grossly negli-
gent manner towards him, the child has
been permitted to maintain a suit. Such
acts are considered an abandonment of the
parental relation leaving no unity or au-
thority to be preserved.'6
There has also been a growing tendency
to abrogate the immunity doctrine where
the tort is not referable to the family
relationship. In Dunlap v. Dunlap,'9 a
son was injured while working for his
father for the summer. The court held
that the immunity derived from the in-
cidental parental relationship would not
attach to the master-servant relationship.2 0
This reasoning has also been used where,
at the time of the tort, the child and parent
were related as omnibus passenger and
carrier.1 The parent was deemed to be
sued for a breach of vocational duties
and not for a violation of his parental
obligations. 22  As an extension of this
policy, courts have allowed suit even
where no added special relationship such
as master-servant existed between parent
and child on the ground that the parent
ent and Child, 5 VILL. L. REv. 521, 537
(1960).
18 Mahnke v. Moore, 197 Md. 61, 68, 77 A.2d
923, 926 (1951).
19 Dunlap v. Dunlap, supra note 15.
2°Id. at 364, 150 Atl. at 911.
21Worrell v. Worrell, 174 Va. 11, 4 S.E.2d
343 (1939).
22d. at 27, 4 S.E.2d at 349. But see Luster
v. Luster, 299 Mass. 480, 13 N.E.2d 438
(1938).
was being sued in his business capacity.3
Thus where a parent violated his duty to
the public at large by negligently con-
ducting his business, he was liable for
his infant's injury. It was reasoned that
immunity only attached to the discharge
of parental duties and did not apply to
non-family transactions.24
Coextensive with the judicial concern
for the maintenance of parental discipline
is the policy argument that family harmony
would be disrupted by parent-child litiga-
tion. 25 Where this factor has no relevance
it is generally held that no immunity would
attach as, for example, where the infant
is emancipated at the time of the tort,
where the parental relation is considered
terminated, 6 and where there has been a
death of one of the parties." In ad-
2"Signs v. Signs, 156 Ohio St. 566, 103 N.E.2d
743 (1952), modified, 161 Ohio St. 241, 118
N.E.2d 411 (1954); Borst v. Borst, 41 Wash.
2d 642, 251 P.2d 149 (1952).
24Borst v. Borst, supra note 23. This ap-
proach is not taken in New York. Epstein v.
Epstein, 283 App. Div. 855, 129 N.Y.S.2d 54
(1st Dep't 1954), reversing 124 N.Y.S.2d 867
(Sup. Ct. 1953).
25Small v. Morrison, supra note 11; Matarese
v. Matarese, supra note 13.
26 Hewlett v. George, 68 Miss. 703, 711, 9 So.
885, 887 (1891). It should be noted that in
the instant case, the defendant, although he was
an unemancipated minor at the time of the
accident, had been emancipated by the time the
action was commenced. The court apparently
gave this fact no weight in arriving at its
holding. See Logan v. Reaves, 209 Tenn. 631,
354 S.W.2d 789 (1962). See also Cannon v.
Cannon, supra note 11, at 429-30, 40 N.E.2d
at 238.
27 In Dean v. Smith, 106 N.H. 314, 211 A.2d
410 (1965), a child sued the estate of de-
fendant-father who had been killed in an auto-
mobile accident. The court explained that the
breakdown of authority and family unity were
dition, intrafamily suits involving minor
siblings 28 and parents suing their un-
emancipated minors in a derivative ca-
pacity 29 have been allowed as consistent
with social interests and without danger to
family peace and harmony.
With liability insurance becoming more
prevalent, plaintiffs have argued that the
traditional bases for prohibiting parent-
child suits have disappeared. 30 It is es-
pecially contended that the presence of
insurance tends to negate any possible
disruption of family harmony. The in-
surance company is the actual party in
interest and sustains the burden of the
recovery. 31  Moreover, it is urged that
insurance can actually promote family
harmony by providing funds for medical
expenses that might otherwise be unavail-
able. 32  Courts have allowed a continuance
of the immunity, however, justifying the
prohibition as necessary to prevent any
less likely to occur where the suit was against
the parent's estate. See also Davis v. Smith,
supra note 15; Oliveria v. Oliveria, 305 Mass.
297, 25 N.E.2d 766 (1940). Contra, Lasecki
v. Kabara, 235 Wis. 645, 294 N.W. 33 (1940).
28 Rozell v. Rozell, 256 App. Div. 61, 8 N.Y.S.2d
901 (3d Dep't), afl'd, 281 N.Y. 106, 22 N.E.2d
254 (1939); Emery v. Emery, 45 Cal, 2d 421,
289 P.2d 218 (1955); Overlock v. Ruedemann,
147 Conn. 649, 165 A.2d 335 (1960); Midkiff
v. Midkiff, 201 Va. 829, 113 S.E.2d 875 (1960).
29 Becker v. Rieck, 19 Misc. 2d 104, 188 N.Y.S.
2d 724 (Sup. Ct. 1959); Munsert v. Farmers
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 229 Wis. 581, 281 N.W.
671 (1938).
30 "Where there is such insurance, it becomes
still more difficult to maintain most of the stock
arguments against allowing recovery." PROSSER,
TORTS § 116, at 888-89 (3d ed. 1964).
31 Goller v. White, 20 Wis. 2d 402, 410, 122
N.W.2d 193, 197 (1963).
32 Badigian v. Badigian, 9 N.Y.2d 472, 479, 174
N.E.2d 718, 723, 215 N.Y.S.2d 35, 41 (1961)
(dissenting opinion).
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perpetration of fraud on the insurance
carrier. 33  Furthermore, although insur-
ance provides a fund which may be reach-
ed without draining the family exchequer,
the courts in the majority of jurisdictions
have refused to hold that insurance
creates a liability where none existed
before. 34
Modern British cases have acknowledged
the relevance of insurance in suits between
minor and parent. In Young v. Rankin.3"
the existence of automobile insurance in a
child-plaintiff suit negated the family
harmony argument. The British court saw
no "unnaturalness" involved in a minor's
negligence action "where the parent is him-
self covered against any loss . . . as the
result of his negligence." 36 Soon there-
after, Wood v. Wood37 extended the
Young rationale to parent-plaintiff suits.
In America, the policy reason for re-
fusing such suits is that the existence of
insurance causes parent-child litigation to
be quite vulnerable to collusion and
fraud. 38 Since the insurance policy usually
demands an adjudication of liability as a
condition precedent to recovery, courts
have indulged in the presumption that a
33 Villaret v. Villaret, 169 F.2d 677 (D.C. Cir.
1948); Luster v. Luster, 299 Mass. 480, 13
N.E.2d 438 (1938); Hastings v. Hastings, 33
N.J. 247, 163 A.2d 147 (1960).
34 Rambo v. Rambo, 195 Ark. 832, 114 S.W.2d
468 (1938); Silverstein v. Kastner, 342 Pa. 207,
20 A.2d 205 (1941); Parker v. Parker, 230 S.C.
28, 94 S.E.2d 12 (1956).
35 [1935] Sess. Cas. 499 (1934). See also
Deziel v. Deziel, [1953] 1 D.L.R. 651 (Canada
1952).
36Young v. Rankin, [1934] Sess. Cas. 499, 514.
31 [1935] Scots L.T.R. 431.
38 Parks v. Parks, 390 Pa. 287, 135 A.2d 65
(1957).
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parent-child suit starts only after the
family member to be sued is prepared to
admit negligence.3 0 Though noting that
the possibility of defrauding third parties
is inherent in many tort actions, it is seen
as a greater probability in parent-child
suits.
A consideration closely allied to that of
parent-child collusion has been the pos-
sible violation of the insurance policy's
cooperation clause by the family defendant.
Such a clause requires that the insured
respond to an insurer's request to attend
hearings and trials, assist in making set-
tlements, and secure and give evidence.4 0
This contractual obligation has been con-
sidered to be in direct conflict with the
parent-child relationship, since "the self
interest of the parent and his natural love
and affection for the child would render
nigh impossible any degree of cooperation
with the insurer.
41
Because of the possibility of fraudu-
lent lawsuits, the courts have been re-
luctant to discuss the direct effect liability
insurance has on parent-child tort immun-
ity, leaving the possible changes to the
legislature.4 2  In Mesite v. Kirchstein,
43
the court indicated that a minor might
recover from his negligent parent if a
statute allowed direct suit against the in-
surer, since the traditional grounds for
3. See, e.g., Hastings v. Hastings, supra note
33.
40 See Griffin v. Fid. & Cas. Co., 273 F.2d 45
(5th Cir. 1960).
41 Supra note 38, at 301, 135 A.2d at 73.
42 Badigian v. Badigian, 9 N.Y.2d 472, 174 N.E.
2d 718, 215 N.Y.S.2d 35 (1961).
4 109 Conn. 77, 145 At. 753 (1929); cf.
Edwards v. Royal Indem. Co., 182 La. 171,
161 So. 191 (1935), where a wife was allowed
to sue her husband under a direct action statute.
allowing the defense of tort immunity
would not then be present.
There have been two recent instances
of what may amount to the complete
repudiation of intrafamily tort immunity.
In Goller v. White, 44 Wisconsin abrogated
parental immunity in all situations, save
where the negligent act involved an exer-
cise of authority over the child or an exer-
cise of discretion with respect to the pro-
vision of necessaries such as food and
clothing.45 The court relied upon its own
thirty-five years of experience with inter-
spousal negligence actions. These actions,
in the opinion of the court, did not appear
to promote family discord, and accord-
ingly, it was doubted whether such discord
would arise from the maintenance of an
action by a child. 46 Similarly, the child's
immunity was abolished in the New Hamp-
shire case of Gaudreau v. Gaudreau.47
There, the child was being sued by the
father's estate for wrongful death and by
his mother for personal injuries. The
court noted that actions between spouses,
and actions against a child for the wrong-
ful death of the parent or minor siblings
were permitted, and reasoned that a par-
ent's action for personal injuries would be
no more disruptive. 48
In the principal case the parent-plaintiff
brought the action against her infant son.
The Court surveyed the history of the im-
munity doctrine, finding that early English
law showed a lack of consistent authority,
but recent decisions had approved both
44 20 Wis. 2d 402, 122 N.W.2d 193 (1963).
45 Id. at 413, 122 N.W.2d at 198.
461d. at 409-10, 122 N.W.2d at 196.
47 106 N.H. 551, 215 A.2d 695 (1965).
48 Id. at 553, 215 A.2d at 696-97.
parents' 49 and children's 50 automobile neg-
ligence suits. The Court discounted the
threat to family unity due to potential
vexatious lawsuits. This confidence was
founded on the belief that few actionable
torts, with the exception of automobile
negligence, were committed within the
family relationship. 51 The expense and
difficulty of prosecution was believed to be
an added impediment to baseless suits.
Recognizing the impact of insurance in this
area, the Court indicated that family unity
might, in fact, be enhanced by such an
opportunity for equitable reparation. Not-
ing the view that liability insurance is
intended for the protection of the injured,
the Court saw no impropriety or conflict of
interest in the parent bringing suit, since
the insurer was the real party in interest. 52
The shifting of the burden of the judg-
ment to the insurer was not considered
an invitation to widespread family col-
lusion. The ability of Minnesota's ju-
diciary to effectively deter collusion, as evi-
denced by actions between owners and
guest passengers, was deemed adequate to
cope with the flood of collusive suits fore-
cast by the proponents of continued im-
munity. 53  The Court believed that if the
general allowance of property actions by
parents create no insurmountable problems,
the same should be true of tort actions. 54
49Wood v. Wood, [1935] Scots L.T.R. 431.
50 Young v. Rankin, [1934] Sess. Cas. 499.




54 Id. at 72. It must be noted that the rule of
intrafamily tort immunity developed against a
background of permissiveness in the area of
intrafamily property litigation. There was an
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In addition, the increasing frequency and
severity of automobile accidents and the
resulting likelihood of injuries to one
member of a family caused by another,
with the prevalence of automobile liability
insurance, influenced the Court.
In order to prevent any injustice to
those minors previously negligent and now
made vulnerable to suit by their parents,
the Court decided to give prospective ap-
plication to its decision. Of course, its
abrogation of immunity applies to the
parties to the instant case, and thereafter
the immunity of a minor from his parent's
negligence action is to be eliminated com-
pletely, effective as of the date of the
decision. The Court also explicitly de-
clared that its decision should not be con-
strued to extend to situations of inter-
spousal immunity or where a child-plaintiff
sues his parent, since the immunity doc-
trines in such actions rest upon different
considerations which must be weighed as
the cases arise.
Such a sweeping change in the law
nevertheless caused the concurring justice
to envision "rebellion against a parent and
disrespect from the child." 55 Indicating
approval of the result of the instant case
early history of such litigation, and such suits
are generally maintainable today. PROSSER,
TORTS § 116 (3d ed. 1964). These actions have
been justified on the ground that absent judicial
redress a parent's withholding of the child's
property would be equivalent to allowing the
parent to profit by a wrong. Small v. Mor-
rison, 185 N.C. 577, 586, 118 S.E. 12, 16
(1923). However, courts have been quick to
note that these property suits have less potential
for antagonism than either negligence or battery
actions. See, e.g., Mesite v. Kirchstein, 109
Conn. 77, 85, 145 At. 753, 755 (1929).
5
-Supra note 51, at 78.
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in the narrow area of automobile ac-
cidents, the concurring opinion expressed
doubt as to any lasting reconciliation based
on purely economic grounds, and stated
that if a family is allowed to litigate other-
wise private disputes in a courtroom, they
should be empowered to do so only by
the legislature.
Sharply criticizing the conclusion of the
majority, the dissent forecast a complete
elimination of intrafamily tort immunity.
It was thought that the rule was changed
without taking into account such factors
as the attitude of the public in general
and families in particular. Other factors
which the dissent felt had been overlooked
were: the relative success of the courts in
treating other sensitive domestic problems
such as custody proceedings; the effect on
insurance rates; the feasibility of an
insurance program providing benefits with-
out regard to fault; the effect of the
child's liability on a joint tortfeasor's right
to contribution. The failure to resolve
these issues indicated to the dissent that
the judicial branch was not properly
equipped to handle such matters. The
dissent concluded, therefore, that the
changing of a well-settled rule should have
been left to the legislature."
The holding of the principal case ex-
pressly extended to all tort actions by a
parent against his child. For purposes of
litigation, the parties will be considered
strangers whether the tort arose from a
completely non-domestic activity or from
ordinary family relations. It seems that
this decision will not result in a flood of
suits arising out of trivial wrongs. It also
56 d. at 78-80.
seems clear that the area of greatest ap-
plication of the rule of the instant case
would appear to lie in automobile accident
litigation because insured infant motorists
have become commonplace.
The strength of this decision rests upon
the fact that it gives greater weight to an
individual's right to civil redress than to
the possibility of fraud or collusion from
allowing such a suit. But since the pos-
sibility of collusion has been given over-
whelming consideration in other decisions,
it is disappointing that the Court did not
give it more in-depth attention. Aware
that insurance is the main motivation for
parent-child suits, the Court seems less
than realistic in its contention that the
insurance company's interest will be safe-
guarded by the watchfulness of the jury
system.
Instead of placing its entire reliance on
the efficacy of civil juries to detect fraud,
it is suggested that the Court should have
defined the elements of collusion as it
would appear in parent-child suits. The
United States Supreme Court has defined
civil collusion as "the existence of fraud of
some kind, the employment of fraudulent
means, or lawful means for the accom-
plishment of an unlawful purpose. . .." 57
The Supreme Court stated that the plain-
tiff's ulterior motive for recovery did not
constitute a defense. Applied to other
than parent-child tort actions, moreover,
courts have warned that the fact an action
is mutually desired does not make it col-
lusive,58 and when issues are fully pre-
57 Dickerman v. Northern Trust Co., 176 U.S.
181, 190 (1899) (bondholder's suit involving
alleged fraudulent jurisdiction).
5s Conyers v. Conyers, 311 Ky. 468, 224 S.W.2d
688 (1949).
sented regarding a real and substantial
controversy, there is no collusion 59 unless
there is a fictitious set of facts arranged
for the sole objective of affecting the rights
of third parties. 60 Courts have not allowed
a presumption of collusion in non-family
actions, but demand direct evidence or an
inference of collusion established by cir-
cumstantial evidence. 1 Indeed, one court
criticized the use of any presumption of
collusion in parent-child cases on the
ground that many insurance companies do
recognize the liability of the insured and
attempt to settle many cases out of court.6"
In addition to the absence of any mean-
ingful discussion regarding the question of
collusion, the Court failed to set down suf-
ficient guidelines for the protection of the
real party in interest, the insurance car-
rier. It would have been extremely help-
ful if the Court had rather analyzed the
place the insured's cooperation clause has
held in insurance-motivated suits. In non-
family actions, actual breach of the co-
operation clause is an affirmative defense
to the subsequent indemnity claim against
the insurer. The insurance company is
thus protected from fraud and the insured
has no right to recover under the policy
where there is willful breach by the in-
5OClinton Coop. Farmers Elevator Ass'n v.
Farmers Union Grain Terminal Ass'n, 223
Minn. 253, 26 N.W.2d 117 (1947).
60 Curb & Cutter Dist. No. 37 v. Parrish, 110
F.2d 902 (8th Cir. 1940).
61 Plumer v. Houghton & Dulton Co., 277
Mass. 209, 223, 178 N.E. 716, 721 (1931).
62Parks v. Parks, supra note 38, at 303, 135
A.2d at 86 (dissenting opinion). Such a
presumption would rest on the assumption that
the defendants are always required to deny any
negligence on their part by the insurance carrier.
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sured, 63 diligence by the insurer to solicit
cooperation,64 and substantial prejudice to
the insurance carrier inherent in the de-
fendant's misfeasance or nonfeasance.6 5
Notwithstanding these weaknesses and
despite the Court's emphatic statement that
other intrafamily immunity doctrines were
not to be affected by this decision, it
seems clear that the Court's rationale, es-
pecially as it reflects its attitude toward
insurance, extends to all categories of in-
trafamily immunity. It is suggested, how-
ever, that the Court in the instant case
has not sufficiently resolved the issues
which have so troubled the courts in
the great majority of jurisdictions that
still adhere to doctrines of intrafamily
immunity. Since the fear of collusion
from these suits seems to be the major
obstacle to a universal abrogation of
parent-child tort immunity, the Court's
cursory treatment of collusion is particu-
larly unsatisfactory.
This decision will have an important
effect on the rights of third persons whose
negligence, concurrent with that of the
child, causes injury to the parent. Gen-
erally, where a defendant has paid more
than his fair share of damages caused by
his own negligence and the concurrent
negligence of another, the defendant has
a right of contribution against the other
joint tortfeasor provided that the co-
defendant had also been adjudged negli-
63 Futch v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 246 La. 688,
166 So. 2d 274 (1964).
64 Mayflower Ins. Co. v. Osborne, 326 F.2d 461
(4th Cir. 1964).
65 Campbell v. Allstate Ins. Co., 60 Cal. 2d 303,
384 P.2d 155 (1963).
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gent. 66  Heretofore, the joint tortfeasor's
right to contribution from the child was
defeated by the child's immunity to liability
for his parent's injury.61
The instant case does no damage to the
rule that insurance has no bearing on the
existence or extent of a particular de-
fendant's liability. The general use of in-
surance was considered a factor only in
the determination of public policy. The
Court's position is that its holding applies
to the uninsured as well as the insured.68
Thus, there still exists the distinct possibil-
ity of financial disaster leading to the
traditionally feared family discord where
the child has not provided for accident
coverage.
Today it is said that the law tends to
be realistic and avoid legal fictions. It
would not be in keeping with such realism
to deal with today's issues on yesterday's
terms. Yet this is precisely what is being
done by the majority of states in the area
of intrafamily automobile negligence suits.
The doctrine of intrafamily immunity was
born in an era before automobiles and
liability insurance were in general use.
Moreover, the supposed beneficiary of the
doctrine, the family, has also undergone
change in adapting to a changing environ-
ment. This being so, the issue of tort
66See N.Y. CPLR 1401; Employers Mut. Cas.
Co. v. Chicago, St. P., M. & 0. Ry., 235 Minn.
304, 50 N.W.2d 689 (1951).
67 Norfolk So. R.R. v. Gretakis, 162 Va. 597,
174 S.E. 841 (1934).
68 Balts v. Baits, supra note 51, at 75.
immunity should be examined in light of,
and with respect to, the modern family, the
automobile and liability insurance.
For what reason should a court deny to
a family member the protection provided
to all the people of the state? While
realism prevents accepting, without skep-
ticism, the view that vigilance and honesty
will prevent all collusion, it demands the
emphatic rejection of the contention that
the courts will be plagued with a flood
of fraudulent suits.
The hesitancy of the courts to remove
immunity without a legislative command 69
is perhaps indicative of a judicial con-
viction of the inadequacy of a liability ap-
proach to automobile accidents involving
the family. A compulsory accident in-
surance program that would automatically
provide for medical and disability benefits
to the insured's family as beneficiaries re-
gardless of fault would justify the retention
of the tort immunity doctrine, but a pro-
gram of this nature would be financially
unwieldy, and equally susceptible to fraud-
ulent claims. In any event, judicial de-
terminations-on a piecemeal basis-con-
cerning such a long standing and prevalent
rule do not seem to be desirable. Many
factors are not as available to consider-
ation by the judiciary as they are to a
legislative commission. The problem has
many ramifications and an overall legis-
lative study of the area is long overdue.
69 Supra note 42.
